In this paper, we study the signature codes for weighted binary adder channel (WbAC) and collusion-resistant multimedia fingerprinting. Let A(n, t) denote the maximum cardinality of a t-signature code of length n, and A(n, w, t) denote the maximum cardinality of a t-signature code of length n and constant weight w. First, we derive asymptotic and general upper bounds of A(n, t) by relating signature codes to Bt codes and bipartite graphs with large girth respectively, and also show the upper bounds are tight for certain cases. Second, we determine the exact values of A(n, 2, 2) and A(n, 3, 2) for infinitely many n by connecting signature codes with C4-free graphs and union-free families, respectively. Third, we provide two explicit constructions for t-signature codes which have efficient decoding algorithms and applications to two-level signature codes. Furthermore, we show from the geometric viewpoint that there does not exist any binary code with complete traceability for noisy WbAC and multimedia fingerprinting. A new type of signature codes with a weaker requirement than complete traceability is introduced for the noisy scenario.
I. INTRODUCTION
The advancement of multimedia technologies with the development of communication networks has led to a tremendous use of multimedia contents such as images, videos and so on. However, such an advantage also poses the challenging task of resisting unauthorized redistribution of multimedia contents. Multimedia fingerprinting is a technique to protect continuous copyrighted data [32] , [36] and several types of anti-collusion codes for multimedia fingerprinting have been investigated in recent decades, see [3] , [7] , [8] , [17] , [18] , [25] , [26] for example.
As in [32] , [36] , suppose that the multimedia content is represented as a real-valued vector x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ) ∈ R m , called the host signal. To prevent unauthorized redistribution of x outside of M authorized users, the dealer constructs a set of watermarks, also called fingerprints, using a linear modulation scheme based on n ≤ m noise-like orthonormal signals F = {f i ∈ R m : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. The set F is known to the dealer but unknown to all the users. The fingerprint w j of the j-th user, 1 ≤ j ≤ M , is represented as
where c ji ∈ {−1, 1} for antipodal modulation and c ji ∈ {0, 1} for on-off keying type of modulation [32] . In this paper, we concentrate on the on-off keying type of modulation, that is, c ji ∈ {0, 1}. Notice that there exists a one-to-one correspondence between w j and c j = (c j1 , c j2 , . . . , c jn ) ∈ {0, 1} n due to the linear independence of {f i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. Hence, designing a collection of fingerprints with desired properties is equivalent to designing a set of binary n-dimensional vectors {c j : 1 ≤ j ≤ M } ⊆ {0, 1} n with the corresponding properties. In the above setting, the dealer distributes to the j-th authorized user the signal y j = x + w j under the assumption that x ≫ w j 1 , which ensures that the embedded fingerprints do not make significant changes to the host signal. A group of malicious users (coalition) may come together and create a forged copy from their fingerprinted contents, but under the Multimedia Marking Assumption [18] , they cannot manipulate the orthonormal signals f i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In a linear attack, a coalition J ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , M } creates a forged copyŷ by taking a linear combination of their copies y j with some real-valued coefficients λ j , that is,
where j∈J λ j = 1, and λ j > 0 for all j ∈ J since we consider that all users in the coalition make contributions to the forged copyŷ. Equivalently,ŷ = x + j∈J λ j w j ,
where the coefficients λ j are chosen by the coalition J but unknown to the dealer. When |J| = t and λ j = 1/t for all j ∈ J, the linear attack is known as the averaging attack. The interested reader is referred to [7] , [8] , [17] , [26] for more details.
To resist the collusion attack, once a forged copyŷ is confiscated, the dealer aims to identify the coalition J whose members createdŷ. First the dealer can calculate r = (r 1 , . . . , r n )
where
for 1 ≤ k ≤ n and ·, · denotes the inner product. Based on the result r, the dealer would like to determine J even though he/she does not know λ j , j ∈ J, which thus requires that the set {c j : 1 ≤ j ≤ M } has some desired properties.
In [18] , Egorova, Fernandez, Kabatiansky and Lee showed that designing {c j : 1 ≤ j ≤ M } which is able to identify a coalition of size no more than t in multimedia fingerprinting is in fact equivalent to designing a t-signature code in the weighted binary adder channel (WbAC). Suppose that M users would like to communicate with the same destination through a shared WbAC in the multiple-access communication system, among which at most t users are active simultaneously. To communicate successfully, each user j is encoded to a unique vector c j ∈ {0, 1} n , 1 ≤ j ≤ M . If the users in J ⊆ [M ] are active at the same time, they input their vectors simultaneously into the WbAC. The output in the destination is a vector r as in (1) , where λ j plays the role of weight depending only on the channel but unknown to all encoders and the decoder. To identify J using the corresponding channel output r, it is required to design {c j : 1 ≤ j ≤ M } ⊆ {0, 1} n with some desired properties. The case that λ j > 0, j ∈ J are real numbers in WbAC was first investigated by Mathys [33] . In this paper, we consider the scenario that λ j > 0, j ∈ J are real numbers such that j∈J λ j = 1, and then the WbAC is essentially a modification of the multimedia fingerprinting channel. Due to the similarity of WbAC and multimedia fingerprinting, in the sequel, we will mainly describe codes with respect to the multimedia fingerprinting channel for simplicity.
Let n, M and q be positive integers, and Q = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1} be the alphabet. A set C = {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c M } ⊆ Q n is called a q-ary code of length n and cardinality M , or an (n, M, q) code, and each c j = (c j1 , c j2 , . . . , c jn ) is called a codeword. We also use an n × M q-ary matrix to depict C in which each column is a codeword. Denote
, let C| I = {c| I : c ∈ C} be the punctured code of C on the positions in I. An (n, M, 2) code is also called a binary code. Let C be a binary code. For any codeword c ∈ C, let supp(c) = {i ∈ [n] : c i = 1} be the support of c. Denote 2
[n] as the family of all subsets of [n], and
w as the family of all w-subsets of [n]. C has constant weight w if |supp(c)| = w for any c ∈ C. Definition 1.1: Let C be an (n, M, 2) code and t ≥ 2 be an integer. C is an (n, M, 2) t-signature code if for any subsets J, K ⊆ [M ] with 1 ≤ |J|, |K| ≤ t and for any real numbers λ j , λ
In multimedia fingerprinting, an (n, M, 2) t-signature code C can trace back to any coalition of size no more than t given a forged copy, and in the WbAC, it can identify any set of at most t active users from the channel output. The decoding complexity is O(nM t ) by checking the output r corresponding to which subset of C with size at most t.
Let A(n, t) denote the maximum cardinality of a t-signature code of length n, and A(n, w, t) denote the maximum cardinality of a t-signature code of length n and constant weight w. In [18] , Egorova, Fernandez, Kabatiansky and Lee gave a construction for t-signature codes and obtained a lower bound of A(n, t).
The lower bound of A(n, t) in Theorem 1.1 is not tight in general since for instance it shows A(3, 2) ≥ 2, while the following example gives A(3, 2) ≥ 5.
Example 1: Let C be a binary code of length 3 defined as below.
It is easy to check that C is a 2-signature code, implying A(3, 2) ≥ 5.
To the best of our knowledge, the values of A(n, t) and A(n, w, t) are hitherto generally unknown except the lower bound of A(n, t) in Theorem 1.1. The main purpose of this paper is to explore bounds for A(n, t) and A(n, w, t) by using combinatorial methods, and to provide explicit constructions for t-signature codes which are equipped with efficient decoding algorithms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we first establish a relationship between tsignature codes and B t codes, obtaining asymptotic upper bounds for A(n, t). General upper bounds for A(n, t) are given via graph theoretic approaches. In Section 3, we show that a 2-signature code of constant weight 2 is equivalent to a corresponding C 4 -free graph, yielding asymptotic values of A(n, 2, 2). An upper bound for A(n, 3, 2) is derived by investigating the extremal properties of 2-signature codes of constant weight 3. In Section 4, we provide two explicit constructions for t-signature codes and also investigate their decoding algorithms and applications. In Section 5, we show from the geometric viewpoint that there does not exist any binary code with complete traceability for noisy multimedia fingerprinting, and introduce a new type of signature codes with a weaker requirement which could be used in noisy multimedia fingerprinting. Conclusion is drawn in Section 6.
II. UPPER BOUNDS OF A(n, t)
In this section, we investigate upper bounds for A(n, t). First, we give an asymptotic upper bound for A(n, t) by building a relationship between t-signature codes and B t codes. Second, we derive a general upper bound for A(n, t) by connecting a t-signature code with a bipartite graph containing no cycles of length less than or equal to 2t.
The concept of B t codes was motivated by B t -sequences introduced by Erdös and Turán in [21] . B t codes for t = 2 were first studied by Lindström in [30] and later in [31] with the notion of B t -sequences of vectors. In recent decades, B t codes were investigated due to their applications to multiple access adder channel, see [13] - [16] for example.
Definition 2.1: Let C = {c 1 , . . . , c M } be an (n, M, q) code and t ≥ 2 be an integer. C is an (n, M, q) B t code if all sums
We have the following relationship between t-signature codes and B t codes. Lemma 2.1: Let C be an (n, M, 2) code and t ≥ 2 be an integer. If C is a t-signature code, then C is a B t code. Moreover, C is a 2-signature code if and only if
Proof:
Notice that {i 1 , . . . , i t } and {j 1 , . . . , j t } might be multi-sets. If they are not multi-sets, by simply taking λ i k = λ j l = 1/t, we have t k=1 λ i k c i k = t l=1 λ j l c j l , a contradiction to that C is a t-signature code. However, if they are multi-sets, we need to deal with it more carefully as follows.
Since t k=1 c i k = t l=1 c j l , by subtracting all the common codewords counted in the two sums, we can obtain two non-empty multi-subsets J, K with J ⊆ {i 1 , . . . , i t }, K ⊆ {j 1 , . . . , j t }, |J| = |K| and J ∩ K = ∅ such that j∈J c j = k∈K c k . Without loss of generality, we may assume |J| = |K| = s with s ≤ t. Then we have j∈J c j /s = k∈K c k /s. By combining the same terms in J and K, respectively, we can obtain two subsets
is the multiplicity of j in J and
, a contradiction to that C is a t-signature code. Hence we have that a t-signature code is a B t code.
When t = 2, it is enough to show the sufficiency. Assume that for any distinct i, j, k, s ∈ [M ], c i +c j = c k +c s , but C is not a 2-signature code. Then according to Definition 1.1, there exist distinct J, K ⊆ [M ] with 1 ≤ |J|, |K| ≤ 2, and also exist λ j , λ
We discuss the following cases.
1) If |J| = 1 or |K| = 1, then we must have J = K, a contradiction to the assumption.
2) If |J| = |K| = 2 and J ∩ K = ∅, then we can have J = K, a contradiction.
3) If |J| = |K| = 2 and J ∩ K = ∅, without loss of generality, we may assume that J = {1, 2} and K = {3, 4}. According to the assumption, there exist λ 1 , λ 2 , λ
For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we discuss the following three subcases of {c 1i , c 2i }.
So, we have c 1 + c 2 = c 3 + c 4 , a contradiction to the assumption since {c 1 , c 2 } ∩ {c 3 , c 4 } = ∅. The lemma follows.
A. Asymptotic upper bounds of A(n, t)
Denote B(n, t) as the maximum cardinality of a binary B t code of length n. Define the largest asymptotic code rates of t-signature codes and binary B t codes as
Denote 
It is obvious from Lemma 2.1 that R(2) = R B (2) and R(t) ≤ R B (t) for t ≥ 3. Combining this with Lemma 2.2, we obtain Theorem 2.1: Let t ≥ 2 be an integer. Then 1) R(2) ≤ 0.5753 and R(4) ≤ 0.4451.
B. General upper bounds of A(n, t)
In the preceding subsection, we obtained an asymptotic upper bound of A(n, t) for any sufficiently large integer n. In this subsection we show a general upper bound of A(n, t) for any positive integer n by relating a t-signature code to a bipartite graph containing no cycles of length less than or equal to 2t.
Denote G = (V 1 , V 2 , E) as a bipartite graph where V 1 , V 2 are two disjoint sets of vertices and E is the set of edges each connecting one vertex in V 1 and the other in
The number of vertices in a cycle is called the length of this cycle, and the girth of a graph G is the length of the shortest cycle in G. If a graph G contains no cycle of length k, it is called C k -free. A matching of G is a subset of edges without common vertices, and a perfect matching is a matching which matches all vertices in G.
Let C be an (n, M, 2) code. For a partition of [n] = I 1 ∪ I 2 with |I 1 | = n 1 , |I 2 | = n 2 and n 1 + n 2 = n, we define a bipartite graph corresponding to
n1 , V 2 = {0, 1} n2 and for any u ∈ V 1 and v ∈ V 2 , {u, v} ∈ E if and only if there exists a codeword c ∈ C such that c| I1 = u and c| I2 = v. Denote e(G) as the number of edges in G. It is obvious that |V 1 | = 2 n1 , |V 2 | = 2 n2 and e(G) = |C|. Moreover, we have the following observation.
Lemma 2.3: If C is a t-signature code, then for any partition of [n] = I 1 ∪ I 2 , the girth of the corresponding bipartite graph G = (V 1 , V 2 , E) is at least 2t + 2.
Proof: To show G = (V 1 , V 2 , E) has girth at least 2t + 2, it suffices to show that G = (V 1 , V 2 , E) contains no cycles of length 2k for any 2 ≤ k ≤ t. Assume that C is a t-signature code, but G = (V 1 , V 2 , E) contains a cycle of length 2k for some 2 ≤ k ≤ t. Without loss of generality, we may assume that the cycle C 2k is
, and e 2k = {v 2k , v 1 }. Then {e i : 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k, i is odd} and {e i : 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k, i is even} are two disjoint perfect matchings of the cycle C 2k . Recall that each edge of G corresponds to a codeword of C. Let c i ∈ C be the corresponding codeword of e i in C 2k for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k, and
Then C 1 and C 2 are two disjoint subsets of C such that |C 1 | = |C 2 | = k and c∈C1 c = c∈C2 c, a contradiction to Lemma 2.1 since C is a t-signature code. The conclusion follows.
The following result was shown in [28] and [29] . Lemma 2.4:
If G contains no cycles of length less than or equal to 2t, then
where c is a constant depending only on t.
Combining Lemmas 2.3 and 2.4, we have Theorem 2.2: For any positive integers n and t,
Proof: Let C be an (n, M, 2) t-signature code with M = A(n, t). According to Lemma 2.3, for any partition of [n] = I 1 ∪ I 2 with |I 1 | = n 1 , |I 2 | = n 2 and n 1 + n 2 = n, the corresponding bipartite graph
where c ′ is constant depending only on t.
Let c = 2c ′ . Then c is a constant depending only on t and the proof is completed.
C. Improved general upper bounds of A(n, 2)
In this subsection, we improve the upper bound of A(n, 2) in Theorem 2.2 via the Zarankiewicz number and the techniques used in extremal set theory. The Zarankiewicz number z(m, m ′ ; s, s ′ ) is defined as the maximum number of edges in a subgraph G of K m,m ′ such that G does not contain K s,s ′ as a subgraph. When t = 2, we consider the bipartite graph without C 4 , that is, the case of s = s ′ = 2. The known result for z(m, m ′ ; 2, 2) can be found in [34] .
Lemma 2.5:
2 /2 for any n ≥ 1. Proof: Let C be a 2-signature code of length n and cardinality A(n, 2). By Lemma 2.3, for any partition of [n] = I 1 ∪ I 2 with |I 1 | = n 1 , |I 2 | = n 2 and n 1 + n 2 = n, the corresponding bipartite graph G of C is a C 4 -free subgraph of K 2 n 1 ,2 n 2 and e(G) = A(n, 2). Hence
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 2.5. It is obvious that the upper bound of A(n, 2) in Theorem 2.3 is better than that in Theorem 2.2 for t = 2. In what follows, we give another upper bound for A(n, 2) which could further improve Theorem 2.3 for certain values of n. The idea comes from [3] in which Blackburn used the same method to derive an upper bound for separable codes.
Theorem 2.4:
Proof: Let C be a 2-signature code of length n and cardinality A(n, 2). Let [n] = I 1 ∪ I 2 be a partition of [n] with |I 1 | = ⌈2n/3⌉ = n 1 and |I 2 | = ⌊n/3⌋ = n 2 . By Lemma 2.3, the corresponding bipartite graph
n2 and e(G) = A(n, 2). For any u ∈ V 1 , denote N (u) = {v ∈ V 2 : {u, v} ∈ E(G)} as the set of all neighbours of u. Then we have
forms a cycle of length 4 in G, which is a contradiction to Lemma 2.3.
The claim above shows that for any distinct u, u
does not contain any subset of size 2. Since each N (u) is a subset of V 2 and contains
subsets of size 2, we have
The maximum value of the sum u∈V1 x u with x u being non-negative integers such that u∈V1
, and x u = 1 for the remaining vertices. Hence
and the theorem follows. By Theorems 2.3 and 2.4, we obtain Corollary 2.5: For any n ≥ 1,
Corollary 2.6: A(2, 2) = 3, A(3, 2) = 5 and A(4, 2) = 7.
Proof: For n = 2, it is easy to check that C = {(1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)} is a 2-signature code. Moreover, Corollary 2.5 shows that A(2, 2) ≤ 3, resulting A(2, 2) = 3. For n = 3, Corollary 2.5 shows that A(3, 2) ≤ 5 which, together with Example 1, yields A(3, 2) = 5. For n = 4, we have that C = {(1, 0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1, 0), (1, 1, 0, 0), (1, 1, 1, 0), (0, 0, 0, 1), (1, 1, 1, 1 )} is a 2-signature code, implying A(4, 2) ≥ 7. Notice that Corollary 2.5 only tells that A(4, 2) ≤ 9. However, we can improve Corollary 2.5 by showing A(4, 2) ≤ 7 whose proof is deferred to the appendix, and thus we have A(4, 2) = 7.
Notice that from Theorem 2.2 and Corollary 2.5, we have R(2) ≤ 2/3 and R(t) ≤ 1/2 + 1/(2t) for any t ≥ 3, which is not as good as that obtained in Theorem 2.1. However, the bounds of A(n, t) in Theorem 2.2 and Corollary 2.5 are more general in the sense that they are valid for any positive integer n, while Theorem 2.1 is only valid for sufficiently large integer n. Moreover, as shown in Corollary 2.6, our general upper bounds of A(n, t) are tight for certain values of n and t.
III. BOUNDS OF A(n, 2, 2) AND A(n, 3, 2)
In this section, we study the combinatorial properties of 2-signature codes of length n and constant weights 2 and 3. Accordingly, the bounds of A(n, 2, 2) and A(n, 3, 2) are obtained.
A. Values of A(n, 2, 2)
Let C be a binary code of length n and constant weight 2. Let G = (V, E) be the corresponding graph of C where V = [n] and for any distinct i, j ∈ [n], {i, j} ∈ E if and only if there exists a codeword c ∈ C such that supp(c) = {i, j}. Then, we have the following observation.
Lemma 3.1: C is a 2-signature code of constant weight 2 if and only if its corresponding graph G is C 4 -free. Proof: We first show the necessity. If there exist four vertices i, j, k, s ∈ [n] which form a cycle ijksi in graph G, then there must exist four distinct codewords c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ∈ C such that supp(c 1 ) = {i, j}, supp(c 2 ) = {j, k}, supp(c 3 ) = {k, s} and supp(c 4 ) = {s, i}. It is easy to verify that c 1 + c 3 = c 2 + c 4 , a contradiction to Lemma 2.1.
On the other hand, assume that the corresponding graph G of C is C 4 -free, but C is not a 2-signature code. By Lemma 2.1, there must exist four distinct codewords c i , c j , c k , c s ∈ C such that c i + c j = c k + c s . If supp(c i ) ∩ supp(c j ) = ∅, then we have {c i , c j } = {c k , c s }, a contradiction to the assumption. Thus there must be four elements in supp(c i ) ∪ supp(c j ) = supp(c k ) ∪ supp(c s ) which form a cycle of length 4 in G, a contradiction to the assumption. The lemma follows.
Let g(n; C 4 ) denote the maximum number of edges in a C 4 -free graph with n vertices. By Lemma 3.1, we have A(n, 2, 2) = g(n; C 4 ). It was proved in [4] , [20] that g(n; C 4 ) = (1/2 + o(1))n 3/2 for any sufficiently large integer n, and in [23] , [24] that g(n; C 4 ) = m(m + 1) 2 /2 for any integer n of the form n = m 2 + m + 1 where m is a power of 2, or a prime power greater than 13. In [9] , the exact values of g(n; C 4 ) for 2 ≤ n ≤ 21 were determined. Now we have the following results for A(n, 2, 2).
Theorem 3.1: Let n ≥ 2 be an integer. 1) If n is sufficiently large, then A(n, 2, 2) = (1/2 + o(1))n 3/2 . 2) If n = m 2 + m + 1 where m is a power of 2 or m > 13 is a prime power, then A(n, 2, 2) = m(m + 1) 2 /2. 3) For 2 ≤ n ≤ 21, the exact values of A(n, 2, 2) are listed in Table I. B. An upper bound of A(n, 3, 2)
In this subsection, we investigate the extremal properties of 2-signature codes of constant weight 3 by means of Frankl and Füredi's method in [22] , where they studied binary codes using extremal set theory.
Let C be a binary code of length n and constant weight 3. Notice that C can be uniquely described as a family
Then, we have the following observation. Lemma 3.2: C is a 2-signature code of constant weight 3 if and only if
2 . Proof: To show the necessity, assume that there exist distinct A, A ′ ∈
[n] 2 and also distinct elements z, z
Next, we show the sufficiency. Assume that C satisfies that
Without loss of generality, we may assume that B k = {a, b, x} and B s = {c, y, z}. Let A = {a, b} and
, also a contradiction. The conclusion then follows. Based on Lemma 3.2, we shall derive an upper bound for A(n, 3, 2) which is the same as an upper bound for weakly union-free families given by Frankl and Füredi [22] . However, the bound cannot be obtained directly from the relationship between signature codes and weakly union-free families, which will be shown in Lemma 3.3 afterwards.
Theorem 3.2: A(n, 3, 2) ≤ n(n − 1)/3 for any n ≥ 3. Proof: Let C be an (n, M, 2) 2-signature code of constant weight 3 with M = A(n, 3, 2). According to (3), we have 3A(n, 3, 2) =
A∈(
[n]
2 )
since each 3-elements set has 3 subsets of size 2 and each codeword in C is calculated three times in the right-hand side of (4). Besides, Lemma 3.2 tells that
Note that the maximum value of A∈( [n] be the corresponding family. If F is weakly union-free, then C is a 2-signature code.
Proof: Assume that F is weakly union-free, but C is not a 2-signature code. By Lemma 2.1, there exist distinct codewords c i , c j , c k , c s ∈ C such that c i + c j = c k + c s . This implies that supp(c i ) ∪ supp(c j ) = supp(c k ) ∪ supp(c l ), a contradiction to the assumption. Then the lemma follows.
We remark that the converse of Lemma 3.3 does not hold. That is, if C is a 2-signature code, the corresponding family F may not be weakly union-free. The following is an example. Its corresponding family is F = {{1, 2, 3}, {3, 4, 5}, {1, 3, 4}, {2, 4, 5}}. It is easy to check that C is a 2-signature code, but F is not weakly union-free since {1, 2, 3} ∪ {3, 4, 5} = {1, 3, 4} ∪ {2, 4, 5}.
Denote F 3 (n) as the maximum cardinality of a weakly union-free family F ⊆
3 . Then by Lemma 3.3, we have A(n, 3, 2) ≥ F 3 (n). It was proved in [6] , [11] that F 3 (n) ≥ n(n − 1)/3 for any n ≥ 24 and n ∈ {13, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21}. Combining this with Theorem 3.2 and Lemma 3.3, we have Theorem 3.3: A(n, 3, 2) = n(n − 1)/3 for any n ≥ 24 and n ∈ {13, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21}.
IV. CONSTRUCTIONS FOR t-SIGNATURE CODES
In this section, we provide two explicit constructions for signature codes, one is based on concatenation and the other on the Kronecker product. We prove that the signature codes obtained from these two constructions have efficient decoding algorithms and large code sizes. Moreover, we propose the concept of two-level signature codes, and show that the product construction could be applied to construct two-level signature codes.
We first recap several classes of combinatorial codes which will be exploited later. Frameproof codes were introduced by Boneh and Shaw [5] aiming to protect innocent users from being framed by any other t colluders but were shown to have no traceability in digital fingerprinting, see [35] for example. Later Cheng and Miao [8] proved that, in fact, frameproof codes have an excellent traceability in a discretized model of multimedia fingerprinting. Superimposed codes were proposed by Kautz and Singleton [27] for retrieving files, and later also extensively investigated in the contexts of disjunct matrices and cover-free families, see [12] , [19] for example.
Let C be an (n, M, q) code. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, denote C(i) = {c i : c = (c 1 , . . . , c n ) ∈ C} as the set of i-th coordinates of C. The descendant code of C is defined as
Definition 4.1: Let t ≥ 2 be an integer. 1) C is an (n, M, q) t-frameproof code, or an (n, M, q) t-FPC, if for any subset C 0 ⊆ C with 1 ≤ |C 0 | ≤ t, we have desc(C 0 ) ∩ C = C 0 . 2) C is an (n, M, 2) t-superimposed code, if for any subset C 0 ⊆ C with 1 ≤ |C 0 | ≤ t and any other codeword c = (c 1 , . . . , c n ) ∈ C \ C 0 , there exists 1 ≤ k ≤ n such that c k = 1 and C 0 (k) = {0}.
A. Concatenated construction
We now give the concatenated construction by taking small signature codes as the inner codes and frameproof codes as the outer codes which is described as follows.
Construction 1: Let A be an (n 1 , M 1 , q) t-FPC over the alphabet Q and B be an (n 2 , q, 2) t-signature code. Define a bijection φ : Q → B. Let C be the code defined by
Then C is an (n 1 n 2 , M 1 , 2) t-signature code.
Proof: It is obvious that C is an (n 1 n 2 , M 1 , 2) code. For any distinct C 1 , C 2 ⊆ C with 1 ≤ |C 1 |, |C 2 | ≤ t, and for any real numbers λ j , λ
Since C 1 = C 2 , without loss of generality, we may assume that there exists one codeword c such that c ∈ C 1 \ C 2 . Suppose that C 1 , C 2 correspond to A 1 , A 2 ⊆ A respectively, and c corresponds to a = (a 1 , . . . , a n1 ) ∈ A. Clearly, |A 1 | ≤ t, |A 2 | ≤ t and a ∈ A 1 \ A 2 . Since A is an (n 1 , M 1 , q) t-FPC, there must exist one coordinate i,
Since the inner code B is a t-signature code, we have
, which implies (6). Hence C is a t-signature code.
The concatenated signature codes are decoded in two steps, that is, first decoding the inner code and then decoding the outer code.
Theorem 4.1: The concatenated signature code C obtained by Construction 1 can trace back to a coalition of size at most t in time O(n 1 n 2 q t + tn 1 M 1 ). Proof: Suppose that r = (r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r n1 ) is an output of multimedia fingerprinting channel where r i = (r i1 , . . . , r in2 ) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n 1 . Suppose that X ⊆ C, |X | ≤ t is the real coalition for the output r. To determine X by r and the code C, we divide the decoding process into the following two steps.
Step 1. First we decode the inner code. For each r i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n 1 , a subset B i ⊆ B, |B i | = s i ≤ t can be traced back since the inner code B is a t-signature code. Denote
The time cost in this step is O(n 1 n 2 q t ).
Step 2. Next we decode the outer code. For the outer code A, detect each codeword a = (a 1 , . . . , a n1 ) ∈ A by checking if a i ∈ Q i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n 1 . If so, then the user corresponding to the codeword Φ(a) ∈ C is identified as a colluder. Denote X = {Φ(a) ∈ C : a ∈ A, a i ∈ Q i , ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n 1 }. The time cost in this step is O(n 1 M 1 ).
Now we show that X will be identified after Steps 1 and 2. To this end, we show that X = X . By
Step 1, we have X ⊆ X . Assume that there exists c 0 ∈ X \ X . Then, by Step 2, we have Φ −1 (c 0 ) ∈ desc({Φ −1 (c) : c ∈ X }), a contradiction to the condition that A is a t-FPC. Hence we have X = X .
Based on Steps 1 and 2, the concatenated signature code C can trace back to a coalition of size at most t in time O(n 1 n 2 q t + n 1 M 1 ). The decoding complexity of an (n 1 n 2 , M 1 , 2) t-signature code is O(n 1 n 2 M t 1 ). According to Theorem 4.1, the (n 1 n 2 , M 1 , 2) t-signature code obtained by Construction 1 could reduce the decoding complexity to O(n 1 n 2 q t + n 1 M 1 ) if we choose an (n 1 , M 1 , q) t-FPC with q < M 1 as the outer code. This can be achieved due to the known results on t-FPCs, see [2] for example.
B. Product construction
Now we provide a product construction by combining superimposed codes and signature codes as follows. Construction 2: Let A be an (n 1 , M 1 , 2) t-superimposed code, and B be an (n 2 , M 2 , 2) t-signature code and 0 ∈ B. Denote B * = B \ {0}. Let C = A ⊗ B * , where A ⊗ B * is the Kronecker product of A and B * :
Proof: It is obvious that B * is an (n 2 , M 2 − 1, 2) code, and thus C is an (n 1 n 2 , M 1 (M 2 − 1), 2) code. For simplicity, we use group notation
where for each group
. . .
For any two distinct subsets
Obviously, |G 1 | ≤ t and |G 2 | ≤ t. We would like to show that for any real
To this end, we consider the following two cases.
1.a) If s = 1, without loss of generality, we may assume
Since A is an (n 1 , M 1 , 2) t-superimposed code, A does not have 0 as a column vector. Then there must exist i,
Since B * is a t-signature code, we have
without loss of generality, we may assume
Without loss of generality, we may assume
for any real numbers λ j , λ, λ
Without loss of generality, we may assume G 1 \ G 2 = ∅ and h ∈ G 1 \ G 2 . Since A is a tsuperimposed code, there exists i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n 1 such that a hi = 1 and a h ′ i = 0 for all h ′ ∈ G 2 . By the construction of C and the fact that B * = B \ {0}, C 1 | Ii contains at least one nonzero vector and
Hence C is a t-signature code. Next we turn to the decoding process of the signature code obtained from Construction 2, which consists of two steps: first decoding the outer code and then decoding the inner code. Notice that this is the converse order of the decoding in Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.2:
The signature code C obtained by Construction 2 can trace back to a coalition of size at most t in time O(tn 2 M t 2 + n 1 n 2 M 1 ). Proof: Suppose that r = (r 1 , . . . , r n1 ) is an output of the multimedia fingerprinting channel where r i = (r i1 , . . . , r in2 ) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n 1 . Suppose that X ⊆ C, |X | ≤ t is the real coalition for the output r. Denote G = {h ∈ [M 1 ] : X ∩ G h = ∅} as the set of group indices of the codewords in X . Obviously, |G| ≤ t. To determine X by r and the code C, we will first determine G, and then determine X ∩ G h for any h ∈ G.
Step 1. For the outer code A, detect each codeword (a h1 , . . . , a hn1 ) ∈ A, 1 ≤ h ≤ M 1 by checking if there exists i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n 1 such that r i = 0 and a hi = 1.
To verify our claim, we first show G ⊆ G. Assume that there exists h ∈ G but h ∈ G, that is, h ∈ G 0 . Then there exists i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n 1 such that r i = 0 and a hi = 1. Notice that r i = 0 implies X | Ii = {0}. Then we have X ∩ G h = ∅, that is, h ∈ G, a contradiction to the assumption. So we have G ⊆ G. On the other hand, we show G ⊆ G. Assume that there exists h ′ ∈ G but h ′ ∈ G. Since A is a t-superimposed code, there exists i ′ , 1 ≤ i ′ ≤ n 1 such that a h ′ i ′ = 1 and a hi ′ = 0 for any h ∈ G. Recall that G is the set of group indices of the codewords in X .
Thus we have X | I i ′ = {0} which implies r i ′ = 0. Then we have h ′ ∈ G 0 , a contradiction to the assumption that h ′ ∈ G since G ∩ G 0 = ∅. So, we have G = G and thus G can be determined after Step 1.
Step 2. In this step, we show how to determine X ∩ G h for any h ∈ G. 1) If |G| = 1, without loss of generality, we may assume G = {1}. Then, X = X ∩G 1 . Since A is a t-superimposed code, there exists i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n 1 such that a 1i = 1. Then we have r i = 0. Since B * is a t-signature code, we can determine X | Ii by r i , and thus can determine X . The time cost in this case is O(n 2 (M 2 − 1) t + n 1 ). 2) If |G| = s ≥ 2, then we have 2 ≤ h∈G |X ∩ G h | ≤ t, and 1 ≤ |X ∩ G h | ≤ t − 1 for any h ∈ G. Since A is a t-superimposed code, for any h ∈ G, there exists i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n 1 such that a hi = 1 and a h ′ i = 0 for any h ′ ∈ G \ {h}. Then we have (X \ G h )| Ii = {0}. Since B = B * ∪ {0} is a t-signature code, we can determine (X ∩G h )| Ii by r i , and thus can determine X ∩G h for any h ∈ G. The time cost in this case is O(tn 2 M t 2 + tn 1 ). Based on Steps 1 and 2, the t-signature code obtained by Construction 2 can trace back to all the colluders of size no more than t in time O(tn 2 M t 2 + n 1 n 2 M 1 + tn 1 ). In general, the decoding complexity of an
t ). Here according to Theorem 4.2, we can reduce the decoding complexity to O(tn 2 M t 2 + n 1 n 2 M 1 + tn 1 ) by using the t-signature code obtained from Construction 2.
C. Two-level signature codes
In this subsection, we show that Construction 2 can also be applied to construct two-level signature codes. Twolevel codes were introduced by Anthapadmanabhan and Barg [1] in digital fingerprinting with the feature that all the codewords are classified into groups and each group consists of several codewords. They showed that a two-level (t 1 , t 2 )-fingerprinting code, where t 1 > t 2 , could identify all the colluders in digital fingerprinting if the coalition size is no more than t 2 , and determine all the groups containing at least one colluder if the coalition size is no more than t 1 . Inspired by this, we introduce the concept of two-level signature codes for multimedia fingerprinting.
Definition 4.2: Let C be an (n, M, 2) code and t 1 , t 2 be positive integers with t 1 > t 2 . Suppose that all the codewords of C are partitioned into M 1 (< M ) groups:
and for any real numbers λ j , λ
By Definition 4.2, in multimedia fingerprinting, a two-level (t 1 , t 2 )-signature code could a) trace back to all the colluders if the coalition size is at most t 2 ; b) determine all the groups each of which contains at least one colluder if the coalition size is at most t 1 . By Definitions 1.1 and 4.2, we have the relationship between signature codes (one-level) and two-level signature codes as follows.
Proposition 4.1: A t 1 -signature code is a two-level (t 1 , t 2 )-signature code, and a two-level (t 1 , t 2 )-signature code is a t 2 -signature code.
The following construction for two-level signature codes is an application of Construction 2. Theorem 4.3: Let t 1 , t 2 be two positive integers such that t 1 > t 2 . Let A be an (n 1 , M 1 , 2) t 1 -superimposed code and B be an (n 2 , M 2 , 2) t 2 -signature code containing 0. Then there exists an (n 1 n 2 , M 1 (M 2 − 1), 2) two-level (t 1 , t 2 )-signature code with M 1 groups.
Proof: By Construction 2, an (n 1 n 2 , M 1 (M 2 − 1), 2) code C can be obtained from A and B. Now we show that C is a two-level (t 1 , t 2 )-signature code. It is obvious that all the codewords of C are divided into M 1 groups and each group contains M 2 − 1 codewords. If a forged copy is created by a coalition of size at most t 2 , all the colluders will be identified by Theorem 4.2. If a forged copy is created by a coalition of size at most t 1 , by Step 1 of the decoding process in the argument of Theorem 4.2, any group containing at least one colluder will be identified. The proof is completed. 
A. Geometric description of signature codes
Let {0, 1} n be the vertex-set of the n-dimensional hypercube. For any subset S = {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c s } ⊆ {0, 1} n , define the open convex polytope of S as
For any distinct S 1 , S 2 ⊆ {0, 1} n , the open convex polytopes of S 1 and S 2 do not cross if
The following observation is immediate according to Definition 1.1. Proposition 5.1: C is an (n, M, 2) t-signature code if and only if for any distinct C 1 , C 2 ⊆ C with 1 ≤ |C 1 |, |C 2 | ≤ t, we have P(C 1 ) ∩ P(C 2 ) = ∅. 
B. Noisy multimedia fingerprinting
In practice, the noisy multimedia fingerprinting channel is more realistic but with more complicate assumptions than the noiseless case. That is, the dealer observes the forged copy with some noise which may be produced artificially by the coalition before redistributing the forged copy, or generated unartificially during the redistribution process of the forged copy. We show from the geometric viewpoint that no coalition could be completely traced back in noisy multimedia fingerprinting.
Assume that the colluders in a coalition J add some noise ε for the purpose of making themselves less likely to be identified, where ε = (ε 1 , . . . , ε m ) ∈ R m \ {0} such that ε < δ and δ is very small. Then the dealer observes the forged copyỹ
Notice that ε is chosen by the coalition J and unknown to the dealer. However, the dealer can calculatẽ
for 1 ≤ k ≤ n, and obtainr = (r 1 , . . . ,r n ) =
where e = (e 1 , . . . , e n ) ∈ R n and e k = ε, f k for 1 ≤ k ≤ n. It should be noted that the dealer does not know what e is, but knows that e ≤ ε .
In noisy multimedia fingerprinting, the dealer would also like to design a binary code C with some properties to identify the whole coalition set J based on the resultr calculated in (12) . We define the complete traceability of a binary code for noisy multimedia fingerprinting as follows.
Definition 5.1: Let C be an (n, M, 2) code, t ≥ 2 be an integer and δ > 0 be a real number. C has (t, δ)-complete traceability if for any J, K ⊆ [M ] with 1 ≤ |J|, |K| ≤ t, and for any e, e ′ ∈ R n with e , e ′ < δ,
Note that if S 1 ∩ S 2 = ∅, then d(S 1 , S 2 ) = 0. We have the following observation. Proposition 5.2: An (n, M, 2) code C has (t, δ)-complete traceability if and only if for any distinct
Proof: Suppose that J, K are two distinct subsets of [M ] with 1 ≤ |J|, |K| ≤ t, and λ j , λ
′ holds for any e, e ′ ∈ R n with e , e ′ < δ if and only if
Notice that j∈J λ j c j is a point located in P(C 1 ) and k∈K λ ′ k c k is a point located in P(C 2 ). Then by Definition 5.1 and (13), we can obtain (14) . The conclusion follows.
According to Proposition 5.2, in noisy multimedia fingerprinting, a coalition with size no more than t can be traced back if and only if there exists a binary code C such that for any distinct (14) is satisfied. However, if C 1 ∩ C 2 = ∅, according to (9) and (13), we always have d(P(C 1 ), P(C 2 )) = 0, and thus (14) does not hold. This immediately implies Proposition 5.3: There does not exist any binary code with complete traceability in noisy multimedia fingerprinting. Although there exists no binary code that can trace back to all the colluders in noisy multimedia fingerprinting, we can design a binary code with a weaker requirement than Definition 5.1 to provide some security. Stinson, Trung and Wei [35] introduced secure frameproof codes in digital fingerprinting to make sure that any illegal copy cannot be generated simultaneously by two disjoint coalition sets. Inspired by this, we introduce frameproof signature codes for noisy multimedia fingerprinting.
Definition 5.2: Let C be an (n, M, 2) code, t ≥ 2 be an integer and δ > 0 be a real number. C is an (n, M, 2) (t, δ)-frameproof signature code if for any J, K ⊆ [M ] with 1 ≤ |J|, |K| ≤ t and J ∩K = ∅, and for any e, e ′ ∈ R n with e , e ′ < δ,
We provide an equivalent description of frameproof signature codes from the geometric viewpoint. Proposition 5.4: C is an (n, M, 2) (t, δ)-frameproof signature code if and only if for any
Example 4: It is easy to see from Example 3 that C = {(0, 0, 0), (1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1)} is a (2, 1/2)-frameproof signature code.
We remark that although a (t, δ)-frameproof signature code C cannot identify any coalition set in noisy multimedia fingerprinting, it can guarantee at least two things:
1) If C 1 ⊆ C is a coalition of size at most t, then C 1 cannot frame any C 2 ⊆ C with |C 2 | ≤ t and C 1 ∩ C 2 = ∅ since they cannot create the same forged copyỹ. 2) If C 1 ⊆ C is a coalition of size at most t andr is the corresponding output of noisy multimedia fingerprinting channel, then any C 2 ⊆ C with |C 2 | ≤ t and d({r}, P(C 2 )) < δ contains at least one colluder.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated signature codes for weighted binary adder channel and collusion-resistant multimedia fingerprinting. We showed the relationships between signature codes and other known combinatorial structures and obtained general and asymptotic upper bounds of t-signature codes. We explored the extremal properties and derived bounds for 2-signature codes of constant weights 2 and 3, respectively. Moreover, we provided two explicit constructions for t-signature codes which have efficient tracing algorithms. We also introduced two-level signature codes and gave an explicit construction for two-level signature codes. At last, we considered signature codes from geometric perspectives, and showed that there does not exist any binary code with complete traceability for noisy multimedia fingerprinting. We also introduced a new type of signature codes for noisy multimedia fingerprinting.
It would be of interest to further improve the bounds for signature codes shown in this paper and find more explicit constructions for signature codes. It would also be of interest to investigate the new type of signature codes introduced in this paper for noisy multimedia fingerprinting. 
By Lemma 2.1, it is easy to check that (15) is still a 2-signature code by exchanging any two rows or any two columns. Moreover, {x 1 , . . . , x 8 } is also a 2-signature code where x i = (x i1 , x i2 , x i3 , x i4 ) and x ij = 1 − c ij for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 8 and 1 ≤ j ≤ 4.
First we divide C into groups with respect to the first and second rows of (15) . Let which implies that a 1 + a 2 = a 3 + a 4 , a 2 + a 3 = a 1 + a 4 , and a 1 + a 3 = a 4 + a 2 .
Since {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 } = {0, 1} 2 , (16) cannot be achieved, a contradiction to the assumption. 1.1.d) If |T 0 | = 0, a similar discussion with the case 1.1.a) will lead to a contradiction. 1.2) |Y 0 | = 3 and |Y 1 | = 2. We can discuss in the same way with the case 1.1) and then also get contradictions. A similar discussion with the case 2.1) will lead to contradictions. Then we have A(4, 2) ≤ 7.
